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Abstract
Information about traﬃc conditions is conveyed to drivers by radio and variable message signs, and more
recently available via the Internet and Advanced Traveler Information Systems (ATIS). This has spurred research
on how travelers respond to information, how much they are likely to beneﬁt from it and how much they are
willing to pay for it. We analyze the decisions of drivers whether to acquire information and which route to take
on a simple congested road network. Four information regimes are considered: No information, Free information
which is publicly available at no cost, Costly information which is publicly available for a fee, and Private
information which is available free to a single individual. We ﬁnd that Private information is individually more
valuable than either Free or Costly information,w h i l et h eb e n e ﬁts from Free and Costly information cannot be
ranked in general. We also ﬁnd that Free or Costly information can decrease the expected utility of drivers who
are suﬃciently risk-averse.
1 Introduction
For decades information about driving conditions and traﬃc delays has been provided to drivers by radio and
variable message signs. More recently, information has become available via the Internet and Advanced Traveler
Information Systems (ATIS). The advent of modern communications technology has spurred research on how trav-
elers respond to information, how much they are likely to beneﬁt from it, and how much they are willing to pay for
it. Because information aﬀects individual travel decisions, individual travel decisions collectively aﬀect travel con-
ditions, and travel conditions determine what information should be conveyed, a complex set of interdependencies
exists.
Due to these complexities much of the research on ATIS has considered simple road networks and focused on
just one or two dimensions of travel behaviour. Furthermore, it is often assumed that travelers seek to minimize
their expected travel costs. In a context where route choice is a decision variable this implies that travelers choose
a route with the lowest expected travel time. But it is unrealistic to assume that expected travel time is the only
criterion for route choice (Abdel-Aty et al., 1997), and a number of recent studies (e.g. Bates et al, 2001; Lam
and Small, 2001; Brownstone and Small, 2005; Small et al, 2005; De Palma and Picard, 2005) have uncovered
convincing empirical evidence that travelers dislike not only travel time, but also uncertainty about travel time.
De Palma and Picard (2006a, 2006b) incorporate travel time uncertainty into the analysis of information systems
with endogenous route choice by assuming that travelers are risk averse and seek to maximize their expected utility
where utility is a decreasing and concave function of travel time. However, De Palma and Picard do not analyze
the decisions of drivers whether to acquire information or the welfare impacts of information as a function of its
cost.
This paper builds on De Palma and Picard (2006a, 2006b) by assuming that information is costly and considering
the decisions of drivers whether to purchase it. The paper therefore spans the literature on demand for information
with endogenous route choice with risk-neutral drivers (e.g. Yang, 1998; Lo and Szeto, 2002) and the literature
that adopts a utility-theoretic approach with risk-averse drivers but does not analyze demand for information (e.g.
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1Kobayashi, 1994; Yin and Ieda, 2001; Yin et al., 2004). In the model individuals have a choice between a “safe”
route and a “risky” route with a capacity that ﬂuctuates unpredictably from day to day. Individuals are risk averse
and weigh average travel time and variability of travel time when choosing a route. Individuals diﬀer in their
degrees of risk aversion so that each trades oﬀ expected travel time and variability of travel time at a diﬀerent rate.
Four information regimes are considered. In the No information regime drivers do not have day-speciﬁci n f o r -
mation and base their route-choice decisions on the unconditional probability distribution of states. The second
regime is one of Free information in which all drivers receive free and accurate information about travel conditions
each day. With this information they can predict the Wardrop equilibrium and the travel times that will prevail
on each route. In the third regime of Costly information drivers can purchase accurate information about travel
conditions for a fee. The analysis focuses on how the purchase decision depends on the fee and the individual
degree of risk aversion, as well as on how the route-choice decisions of informed drivers aﬀect the expected utility
of drivers who do not purchase information. The ﬁnal information regime is one of Private information in which
information is made available free to a single individual.
Two results stand out. The ﬁrst is that Private information is always beneﬁcial to a driver relative to No
information, and the individual beneﬁt exceeds the beneﬁtf r o mFree information or Costly information.T h e
second, and more, notable ﬁnding is that Free information or Costly information leaves suﬃciently risk-averse
drivers worse oﬀ even though they may be willing to pay for the information given that other drivers have acquired
it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and explains the measurement of welfare
change using compensating variation. As a benchmark, Section 3 analyzes the equilibria and welfare properties
of the information regimes when drivers are risk-neutral. Section 4 derives equilibria for the No information
and Free information regimes when drivers are risk averse, and analyzes the positive and normative impacts of
Free information. Section 5 – which constitutes the heart of the paper – conducts a parallel analysis for Costly
information. Section 6 considers Private information and compares its beneﬁts with the beneﬁts of Free information
and Costly information. Section 7 presents a numerical example that illustrates the theoretical results and conveys
a sense of the magnitude of the welfare impacts. Section 8 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
This section presents the model of De Palma and Picard (2006b), deﬁnes the information regimes and explains the
measurement of welfare change. De Palma and Picard’s (2006b) notation is modiﬁed and simpliﬁed where feasible
to streamline extensions in later sections.
2.1 Assumptions
In the model a mass N of drivers travels from a common origin to a common destination. N is ﬁxed and exogenous.
Each driver has to choose between a safe route, S, with a deterministic and known travel time tS,a n dar i s k y
route, R, with a stochastic travel time TR which depends on the state. There are two states: a good state denoted
“−” with a travel time t
−




R.F o rb r e v i t yt h et w o
states will hereafter be called Good days and Bad days. The probability of a Bad day is p ∈ (0,1) which is assumed














There is congestion on route S,a sw e l la so nr o u t eR on Bad days, in the sense that travel time on route j increases
with the number Nj of users who choose route j, j = R,S. However, there is no congestion on route R on Good
days: t
−
R is constant. To formalize:
Assumption 1 Travel time tS(NS) is continuous and strictly increasing in NS. On Good days travel time on
route R is a constant t
−
R. On Bad days, travel time is a continuous and strictly increasing function t
+
R(NR) of NR.








S .T h r e e f u r t h e r
assumptions about travel times are made. First, on Good days route R is faster than S even with NS =0 . Second,
on Bad days travel time on R is always longer than on Good days even with NR =0 . Finally, if all drivers choose
one route on a Bad day then it is slower than the other (unused) route. Therefore:
2Assumption 2 The following inequalities hold:
t
−







No assumption is made about the relative magnitudes of tS(0) and t
+
R(0).
Assumptions 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1. The number of drivers taking route R, NR,i sm e a s u r e di n
the usual way to the right from the left-hand vertical axis, while the number taking route S, NS,i sm e a s u r e dt o
the left from the right-hand axis. Travel times are measured on the vertical axes. Functions t
+
R(NR) and tS(NS)
intersect where NR > 0 and NS > 0 and lie wholly above the horizontal line at t
−
R.
Figure 1: Travel time functions
Drivers’ preferences are speciﬁed in:
Assumption 3 Drivers’ preferences are represented by a diﬀerentiable utility function U (t;θ) where θ ≥ 0 is the
risk aversion parameter. For θ =0 , U (t;0)=−t.F o rθ>0 and t>0, U (t;θ) is strictly decreasing and strictly
concave in t.F o r θ>0, ∂U (t;θ)/∂θ is a strictly concave function of U and Lim
θ→∞
U (t2;θ)/U (t1;θ)=∞ for
t2 >t 1 > 0.
It is straightforward to check (see Appendix 1) that Assumption 3 is satisﬁed for Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA) preferences and Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) preferences. For CRRA the utility
function is U (t;θ)=−t1+θ
1+θ ,a n df o rC A R Ai ti sU (t;θ)=
1−exp(tθ)
θ . CARA preferences will be adopted in the
numerical example of Section 7.
Expected utility on a route is EU (T;θ)=pU (T +;θ)+( 1− p)U (T−;θ),w h e r eT+ denotes travel time on the
route on Bad days, and T− denotes travel time on Good days. The distribution of θ in the population is described
in:






⊂ R+ for θ
M ∈ [0,∞)). The distribution is characterized by the strictly increasing cumulative
distribution function F (θ) ∈ [0;1], ∀θ ∈ I, and by the density f (θ) > 0, ∀θ in the interior of I. If the distribution











3The last assumption of Assumption 4 implies either that expected travel time is larger on R when all drivers
select R,o rt h a tθ
M is suﬃciently large. This assumption is necessary for an interior equilibrium to exist. Otherwise,
all the users would select R when the state is unknown.1
2.2 Information regimes
Four information regimes will be considered that diﬀer according to drivers’ knowledge of the state before they
make a route choice:
No information (Z):2 drivers know the probability p, but not the actual state.
Free information (F): all drivers are informed about the state at no cost.
Costly information (C): all drivers can learn the state at a cost π.
Private information (I): a single driver learns the state at no cost.
For each information regime, all drivers are assumed to know all the parameters of the model (values of p and
t
−
R, congestion functions tS (.) and t+ (.), distribution of θ, price of information π), and to be able to compute the
equilibrium solution.3 With Private information the equilibrium is the same as with No information since the
route choice of one (atomless) driver does not aﬀect traﬃc conditions.
I nt h ec a s eo fCostly information it is assumed that the price of information is equivalent to an increase in
travel time. By assuming that the value of time is constant and normalized to unity, expected utility can be written
EU (T + π;θ). For all regimes except Free information the division of traﬃc between routes is characterized by:
Proposition 1 On Bad days, in the No information, Costly information and Private information regimes traﬃc
N
+















Proof. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that route R is preferred by all users to route S on Good days even if everyone
takes R.I fR were also preferred to S on Bad days, then R would be preferred to S whatever the state. But this
implies N
+
R = N and t
+
R (N) ≤ tS (0), which contradicts Assumption 2.
Depending on their preferences and on π,i nt h eCostly information regime drivers choose between three
strategies:
• Strategy R (nR drivers): Do not pay for information and choose route R in both states.
• Strategy S (nS drivers): Do not pay for information and choose route S in both states.
• Strategy I (nI drivers): Pay for information. Given Assumption 2 and Proposition 1, the best choice when
informed is route R on Good days and route S on Bad days.
The following conservation laws apply:











j on route j when the state is q is therefore as given in Table 1:
Route j \ State q Bad days (q =“+” ) Good days (q =“− ”)
j = R N
+
R = nR N
−
R = nR + nI = N − nS
j = S N
+
S = nS + nI = N − nR N
−
S = nS
Table 1: Route split in Costly information regime
1No similar assumption is necessary when θ is distributed over R+ since the assumption t+
R(N) >t S(0) guarantees that a suﬃciently
risk averse driver prefers route S to route R.
2Superscript Z (zero information) is used for the No information regime rather than N to avoid confusion with the number of
drivers.
3Equivalently, and less restrictively, it can be assumed that all drivers know π and the probability distribution of travel times on
the two routes conditional on the information regime and whether they are informed.
4The strategies, the numbers of drivers choosing each strategy, their route choices and expected utilities in the four
information regimes are summarized in Table 2. Note that Strategies R and S a r ee q u i v a l e n tt oar o u t ec h o i c ei n




















































































































































































Table 2: Strategies, numbers of drivers, route choices and expected utilities
2.3 Measuring welfare change
Willingness to pay is measured in economics using compensating variation and equivalent variation (see Varian
1992, Chapter 10). The compensating variation is deﬁned to be the amount an individual is willing to pay for a
change to take place, whereas equivalent variation is deﬁned to be the amount an individual requires in order to be
as well oﬀ as if a change takes place. Compensating variation (CV) will be adopted here since it is assumed when
assessing the Free, Costly and Private information regimes that information is actually provided so that the change
does take place. CV will be measured in time units in the same way that the cost of information is measured; thus
it corresponds to the additional certain travel time that a driver is willing to incur for information. Since the value
of time (VOT) is assumed to be constant, if desired CV can be translated into monetary units by multiplying the
CV by the VOT.
Deﬁnition 1 The individual compensating variation CV r (θ),r∈ {F,C,I}, corresponds to the additional time
an individual with utility U (.;θ) is willing to incur for a transition from the No information regime to information
regime r.
The compensating variation for information depends, ap r i o r i , on who receives the information because this
aﬀects traﬃc equilibrium. Consequently, the CVs for Free, Costly and Private information all diﬀer in general.
3 Equilibria with risk-neutral drivers
To develop a preliminary understanding of the model as well as to provide a benchmark against which to assess
the implications of risk aversion, it is instructive to identify and characterize equilibria for the four information
regimes when drivers are risk neutral.5
4With Free information all drivers are informed at no cost. Since, however, nF+
R drivers take route R on Bad days they can be
thought of as choosing Strategy R and ignoring the state.
5Risk neutrality is a limiting case of the model with a compact distribution of risk aversion with parameter θM in Assumption 4
set to zero.
53.1 Free information equilibrium
In the Free information regime all drivers choose route R on Good days and incur a travel cost CF− = t
−
R.T h e
equilibrium corresponds to point F
−






, where the subscript R on F
−
R indicates
that the outcome is realized on Route R.O n Bad days, drivers divide themselves between routes according





















corresponding point in Figure 2 is F
+
R,S where the subscript R,S indicates that the outcome is realized on both











Figure 2: Eﬀects of Free information with risk-neutral drivers
3.2 No information equilibrium and Private information
If drivers do not know the state and are risk neutral, they allocate themselves between routes so that expected
















S identiﬁes the equilibrium for
users of Route S. This outcome is certain because travel costs are the same in both states. Point Z
−
R identiﬁes the
outcome for users of Route R on Good days, and Z
+
R the outcome on Bad days. The comparative statics properties
of the equilibrium are derived in Appendix 2 and presented in Table 3, where a positive partial derivative is denoted
by a “+”and a negative partial derivative by a “ − ”.
p N
nR − ∈ (0,1)
nS + ∈ (0,1)
E·CZ + +
Table 3: Comparative statics of No information equilibrium with risk neutral drivers
As expected, an increase in the probability of Bad days reduces usage of route R, increases usage of route S,a n d
increases expected travel costs. If the number of drivers increases, usage of both routes increases as do expected
travel costs.
6To obtain nZ
S = N − nZ







6With risk-neutral drivers the compensating variation for Free information is simply the diﬀerence in expected


















0. CV F is positive because on Bad days fewer drivers take route R; i.e. n
F+
R <n Z
R. The welfare gain can be
decomposed into three parts. First, on Good days information beneﬁts drivers who would otherwise take route
S.T h i sb e n e ﬁti si d e n t i ﬁed by the speckled area labeled B− in the lower right of Figure 2. Second, on Bad days
information beneﬁts drivers who take route R as indicated by the speckled area B+ in the upper left. Finally,
information imposes a loss on drivers who take route S as shown by the lightly shaded area L+ to the upper right.7
However, this loss is outweighed by the beneﬁts.8
Free information reduces expected travel time, as well as variability of travel time on route R.B u t i t a l s o











) and results in travel time uncertainty for all
drivers. This uncertainty is of no consequence per se for risk-neutral drivers, but it does matter with risk-averse
drivers as will be shown in Section 4.
Before turning to Costly information consider the Private information regime. If a single driver is informed he
can take route R on Good days, and route S on Bad days. The compensating variation for Private information is


































. Information is more valuable when it is private because the beneﬁts
of shifting to route S on Bad days are not dissipated by similar adjustments of other drivers. As will be seen,
the advantage of Private information over Free information holds – and with greater force – when drivers are
risk-averse.
3.3 Costly information equilibrium
Equilibrium for the Costly information regime with risk-neutral drivers is derived in Appendix 2. In order for
some drivers to be willing to purchase information (Strategy I) the cost must be bounded above; otherwise the
equilibrium is the same as with No information. Regardless of the cost of information some drivers choose not to
purchase it and stick to route R (Strategy R). If the cost of information exceeds a lower bound then some drivers
choose Strategy S; otherwise all drivers adopt either Strategy R or Strategy I. The comparative statics properties
of equilibrium are presented in Table 4. Predictably, as the cost of information increases, nC
I decreases and nC
R and
nC
S increase. As the probability of Bad days increases, nC
S rises and nC
R falls. The eﬀect on nC
I is indeterminate.
It turns out (see Appendix 2) that the derivative is positive when p is small, and negative when p is large. This is
because travel time uncertainty is greatest for intermediate values of p. Perhaps surprisingly, nS is independent of
N.9 As will be seen this result does not obtain with risk-averse drivers.
π p N
nR + − ∈ (0,1)
nS
+ if nS > 0
0 if nS =0
+ if nS > 0
0 if nS =0 0
nI −
? if nS > 0
+ if nS =0 ∈ (0,1)
ECC + + +
Table 4: Comparative statics of Costly information equilibrium with risk neutral drivers
Equilibrium with Costly information is depicted in Figure 3 for the case with nC
S > 0.O nGood days, Groups
R and I take Route R and realize an outcome at point C
−
R,I.G r o u pS i n c u r sah i g h e rc o s ta tp o i n tC
−
S .O nBad
days, Group R ends up at point C
+
R, while Groups S and I incur a lower cost at point C
+
S,I.G r o u pI enjoys the
best of both worlds, but pays a fee π for the privilege.
7Area B− corresponds to what Zhang and Verhoef (2006) call decision-making beneﬁts. Areas B+ and L+ correspond to what they
call travel cost beneﬁts (or costs).








S (weighted by the probability of Bad days) which exceeds area L+.A r e aB− thus outweighs area
L+,a n da r e aB+ adds to the net beneﬁt.
9To see why, note that the choice between strategies I and S depends on the cost of information relative to the travel time saved
on Good days from taking route R. Since both the cost of information and travel time on R on Good days are constants, travel time
on route S must also be constant and hence usage of S must be independent of N.
7Figure 3: Eﬀects of Costly information with risk-neutral drivers
Since expected travel costs are the same for all three groups, the compensating variation for Costly information
can be computed for any of them. For Group R, expected costs are ECC































R . This is apparent in Figure 3 from the fact that area B+ is thinner than in Figure 2. For Group S









Consequently, Group S suﬀers less variability in costs – which is advantageous if they are risk averse as in the
general model.
4 Equilibrium for No information and Free information regimes with
risk-averse drivers
This section establishes some properties of the No information and Free information regimes when drivers are
risk averse, and examines the compensating variation for Free information. Some of the results generalize results
derived in de Palma and Picard (2006b), and other results are new.10
4.1 Existence and uniqueness of equilibria
The equilibrium of the Free information regime is described by:
Theorem 1 Consider the Free information regime. Under Assumptions 1 and 2:




S =0 ) .



















Proof. See Appendix 3.
On Good days all drivers prefer route R.O n Bad days both routes are used and all drivers are indiﬀerent
b e t w e e nt h e m .T h ee q u i l i b r i u mi st h es a m ea sw h e nd r i v e r sa r er i s k - n e u t r a l .
The individual route choice decisions in the No information regime are described by:
10De Palma and Picard (2006b) derive most of their results for CRRA and CARA preferences. The results here are derived under
Assumption 3, which includes CRRA and CARA as special cases and permits more compact proofs.
8Theorem 2 Consider the No information regime. Under Assumptions 1-4, for any NR such that t
+
R (NR) >
tS (N − NR) and pt
+
R (NR)+( 1− p)t
−
R <t S (N − NR):
(a) There exists a unique risk aversion threshold ˜ θ
Z





(p,NR) is strictly decreasing in p and NR,
Proof. See Appendix 4.
According to Theorem 2, whenever expected travel time is lower on R than on S a group of drivers with the
least risk aversion prefer to use R, and the remainder prefer S. An obvious corollary of Theorem 2 is that the
number of users on route R in the No information regime, nZ








Equilibrium in the No information regime is described by:
Theorem 3 Consider the No information regime. Under Assumptions 1-4, there exists a unique equilibrium traﬃc


































































are decreasing in p.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
We now turn to a comparison of the No information and Free information regimes.
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions 1-4:





(b) Free information reduces expected travel time for all drivers, and the reduction is larger for the most risk




































(c) Free information reduces the variability of travel time for the least risk-averse drivers, and increases the
variability of travel time for the most risk-averse drivers.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
The compensating variation for Free information equalizes individual expected utility in the No information and
Free information regimes, and is therefore driver-speciﬁc. Recall that with No information the nZ
R least risk-averse




















and the N − nZ





.I nt h eFree
information regime, all users choose R on Good days (with travel time t
−
R) and are indiﬀerent between R and S on
Bad days since equilibrium traﬃco nR on Bad days, n
F+















compensating variations for Free information for groups R and S, CV F
R (θ) and CV F




















































































The left-hand side of each equation in (2) is expected utility in the Free information regime with CV added to
travel time, and the right-hand side is expected utility in the No information regime. The pair of equations in (2)
is the counterpart to the equation CV F = ECZ − ECF for risk-neutral drivers.
9A c c o r d i n gt oT h e o r e m4, Free information reduces expected travel time for all drivers, and the reduction is
larger for the most risk-averse drivers who choose route S. Compensating variation, however, exhibits a diﬀerent
pattern. Under Assumption 3, CV F
R (θ) is an increasing function of θ,a n dCV F
S (θ) i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fθ.





who are indiﬀerent between strategies R and S.
Furthermore, CV is negative for drivers who are suﬃciently risk averse. (This follows intuitively from the deﬁnition
of CV F



















so that drivers who take the safe route fare worse on
Bad days when information is provided.) These results are formalized in:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) The compensating variation for Free information is an increasing function of risk aversion for the least
risk-averse drivers who take route R with No information, and a decreasing function of risk aversion for the most
risk-averse drivers who take route S with No information.
(b) When the risk aversion parameter is distributed over R+, the compensating variation for Free information
is negative for the most risk-averse users.
Proof. Part (a) is proved in Appendix 7. Part (b) is proved in Appendix 8.
T h em o s tr i s ka v e r s ed r i v e r st a k et h es a f er o u t ei nt h eNo information regime. They gain and lose from Free
information. They gain on Good days because they can save time by shifting to the risky route. But they lose on
Bad days because some of the least risk averse drivers shift onto the safe route. This increases travel time on the
safe route and also increases the variability of travel time that the most risk averse drivers experience. The beneﬁt
on Good days outweighs the loss on Bad days for drivers with intermediate levels of risk aversion. (Recall from
Section 3 that this is true of all drivers if drivers are risk-neutral.) But for the very most risk averse drivers the
beneﬁt is outweighed by the loss.
Free information can be individually welfare-reducing because it can induce changes in driver behaviour that
exacerbate congestion in a particular way. The expected private beneﬁt that an individual derives from adjusting
his or her route choice on the basis of daily travel conditions can be outweighed by the eﬀects of adjustments by
other drivers. As the next section demonstrates, this is also possible if drivers have to pay for information.
5 Equilibrium for Costly information regime with risk-averse drivers
The Costly information regime is more complicated than the No information regime since drivers can choose
between three strategies (R, S and I) rather than just two (R and S). Similar to the approach taken for the No
information regime, equilibrium will be derived in two steps. In the ﬁrst step an individual driver’s strategy choice
for information acquisition and route selection is derived while holding ﬁxed the numbers of drivers who adopt
each strategy (i.e. nR, nS and nI). For the second step the sets of drivers choosing each strategy and thus the
equilibrium values of nR, nS and nI are determined given the individual strategy choices derived in step 1.
5.1 Driver strategy choice with exogenous traﬃc
The ﬁrst step is to derive an individual driver’s choice between strategies R, S and I as a function of θ,t h ep r i c eo f
information, π,a n dt r a ﬃc conditions (nR, nS, nI).11 If a driver is not informed the choice is restricted to strategies
R and S. The preference ranking between R and S is described by the condition:












>p U(tS (nS + nI);θ)+( 1− p)U (tS (nS);θ),
where the expected utilities of R and S are as given in Table 2. Rearranging terms, this condition can be written
in terms of the diﬀerence in utilities:



















− U (tS (nS);θ)
¤ > 0.
Naturally, this condition does not depend on the price of information – although if π is small enough a driver may
prefer strategy I to either R or S. The properties of the preference ranking are described in:
11Note that traﬃc conditions depend only on the numbers of drivers adopting each strategy, and not independently on the distribution
of risk aversion within each group.
10Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) There exists a unique risk aversion threshold ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I) such that R Â S ⇔ θ<ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I).
(b) For ˆ θRS < ∞, ˆ θRS is decreasing in p and nR, and increasing in nS and nI.
Proof. See Appendix 9.
The preference ranking between strategies R and I is described by the condition:



















which is equivalent to:

























Note that this condition depends on the combined numbers of drivers who choose Strategies S and I, nS +nI,b u t
not independently on nS and nI. The properties of the preference ranking are described in:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) There exists a unique risk aversion threshold ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI) such that R Â I ⇔ θ<ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI).
(b) For ˆ θRI < ∞, ˆ θRI is decreasing in p and nR, and increasing in π and nS + nI.
Proof. See Appendix 10.
The preference ranking for the ﬁnal pair of strategies, I and S,i s :






>p U(tS(nS + nI);θ)+( 1−p)U(tS(nS);θ),
or
I Â S ⇔ ψIS(θ,π;p,nS,n I) ≡











The properties of the preference ranking are given in
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) There exists a unique risk aversion threshold ˆ θIS(π,p,nS,n I) such that I Â S ⇔ θ<ˆ θIS (π,p,nS,n I).
(b) For ˆ θIS < ∞, ˆ θIS is decreasing in π, p and nI,i n d e p e n d e n to fnR,o fa m b i g u o u ss i g ni nnS, but increasing in
nS with nS + nI held ﬁxed.
Proof. See Appendix 11.
Figure 4 depicts the combinations of (θ,π) for which drivers choose strategy R, S or I when traﬃc conditions
are ﬁxed. Along the boundary labelled R ≈ S, ψRS =0and drivers are indiﬀerent between R and S. The boundary
between regions R and I where R ≈ I, and the boundary between regions I and S where I ≈ S, are interpreted
similarly. The following lemmas establish the locations of the indiﬀerence curves as depicted in Figure 4.
Lemma 1 When R Â S,t h ec u r v eR ≈ I lies below the curve I ≈ S.W h e nS Â R,t h ec u r v eR ≈ I lies above
the curve I ≈ S.
Proof. Transitivity of preferences implies that, when R Â S and I ≈ S,t h e nR Â I and the curve R ≈ I is located
at a lower π. Similarly, when S Â R and I ≈ S,t h e nR Â I and the curve R ≈ I is located at a higher π.
L e m m a1c o n ﬁrms that the decision whether to become informed involves a comparison between I and R for
the least risk-averse drivers, and a comparison between I and S for the most risk-averse drivers.
Lemma 2 When π = θ =0 , I Â S and either R Â I or I Â R depending on the value of nR.
Proof. When θ =0 , U (t;0)=−t by Assumption 3. If π =0in addition, then
ψIS(θ =0 ,π=0 ;p,nS,n I)=( 1− p)
£




> 0,a n d
ψRI (θ =0 ,π=0 ;p,nR,n S + nI)=p
£





Propositions 3, 4 and 5 are summarized in:
11Figure 4: Strategy choice with Costly information
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1-4, for any (p,nR,n S,n I) there exists a unique price b π(p,nR,n S,n I) > 0,
au n i q u er i s ka v e r s i o nt h r e s h o l dˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I) and two functions ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI) and ˆ θIS(π,p,nS,n I)
respectively increasing and decreasing in π such that:
ˆ θRI (b π(p,nR,n S,n I),p,n R,n S + nI)=ˆ θIS(b π(p,nR,n S,n I),p,n S,n I)=ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I).
A driver selects strategy R if θ<ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I) and θ<ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI);s e l e c t sS if θ> ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I)
and θ>ˆ θIS(π,p,nS,n I),a n ds e l e c t sI if θ>ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI) and θ<ˆ θIS(π,p,nS,n I).F o rˆ θRS < ∞, ˆ θRS is
decreasing in p and nR, and increasing in nS and nI.F o rˆ θRI < ∞, ˆ θRI is decreasing in p and nR, and increasing
in π and nS + nI.F o rˆ θIS < ∞, ˆ θIS is decreasing in π, p and nI, independent of nR, of ambiguous sign in nS,
but increasing in nS with nS + nI held ﬁxed.
5.2 Driver strategy choice and equilibrium
Proposition 6 characterizes individual driver strategy choices with Costly information for given traﬃc conditions.
The analysis now proceeds to the derivation of equilibrium values of nC
R, nC
S and nC
I as functions of π.T h eﬁrst
step is to establish a critical price for information above which no drivers choose to be informed.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1-4, for any probability p ∈ (0,1) and any N>0,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u e
price πC (p,N), a unique risk aversion threshold θ
C














0 (p,N) and nC
R0 (p,N) are decreasing in p.
Proof. By Proposition 6, for any (p,nR,n S,n I) there exists a unique price π =ˆ π(p,nR,n S,n I) and a unique risk
aversion threshold ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I) such that a driver with risk aversion ˆ θRS is indiﬀerent between R, S and I.
With π =ˆ π, nI =0 . The size of group R is nR = NF (θ) with θ = ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I =0 ) .B yA s s u m p t i o n4 ,F (·)
is continuous and strictly increasing in θ over its support so that nR is a continuous and strictly increasing function
of θ,w i t hnR =0at θ =0and Lim
θ→∞
nR = N. By Proposition 3, ˆ θRS is continuous and decreasing with nR,a n d
continuous and increasing with nS. And by Assumption 4, ˆ θRS (p,nR = N,nS =0 ,n I =0 )< ∞. Hence the pair of
12equations nR = NF (θ) and θ = ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I =0 )has a unique solution nR = nC

























To establish the comparative statics properties for p,c o n s i d e rp0 >p .T h e c u r v e n = NF (θ) is unchanged






R0 (p0,N) <n C
R0 (p,N).
Proposition 7 establishes the existence of a critical price for information, πC (p,N), at and above which no driver








. It remains to establish existence of equilibrium when π<π C (p,N).




I (π,p,N)=N − nC
R (π,p,N) − nC
S (π,p,N).I f π ≥ πC (p,N),t h ee q u i l i b -
rium is as described in Proposition 7 . If π<π C (p,N), there exist unique risk aversion thresholds, θA (π,p,N)
and θB (π,p,N) >θ A (π,p,N), such that a driver with θ<θ A (π,p,N) selects Strategy R, a driver with θ ∈
(θA (π,p,N),θ B (π,p,N)) selects Strategy I,a n dad r i v e rw i t hθ>θ B (π,p,N) selects Strategy S. The compara-
tive statics properties of nC
R, nC
S, nC
I , θA and θB are given in Table 5.
Proof. For π = πC (p,N) the equilibrium is as described in Proposition 7 with no one choosing strategy I.
The same equilibrium clearly applies for π>π C (p,N).F o r π<π C (p,N) all three strategies R, S and
I are selected. By Proposition 6, for any (p,nR,n S,n I) there exists a unique price ˆ π(p,nR,n S,n I) and two


























I ,ˆ θRI,ˆ θIS
´
can be
solved in two steps. The ﬁrst step is to solve nR and ˆ θRI. The function NF(θ) is continuous and strictly in-
creasing in θ over its support. By Proposition 4 or 6, ˆ θRI is continuous, decreasing in nR, and increasing in
nS + nI.A n dˆ θRI (π,p,N,0) < ∞. Hence the pair of equations nR = NF(θ) and θ = ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,N− nR) has
a unique solution nR = nC
R (π,p,N) and θ = θA (π,p,N) with nC







The second step is to solve nC
S,n C






I = N − nC
R. The function
nS = N (1 − F (θ)) is continuous and decreasing from N −nC
R to 0 as ˆ θIS increases from ˆ θRS to ∞.B yP r o p o s i t i o n
5o r6 ,ˆ θIS is a continuous and increasing function of nS with nS + nI held ﬁxed. Hence the pair of equations
nS = N (1 − F (θ)) and θ =ˆ θIS
¡
π,p,nS,n I = N − nC
R − nS
¢
has a unique solution nS = nC








. Finally, nI = nC
I (π,p,N)=N − nC
R − nC
S.
Comparative statics properties of the equilibrium are derived in Appendix 12.
π p N
nR + − ∈ (0,1)
nS ? + ?
nI ? ? ?
θA + − ?
θB ? − ?
Table 5: Comparative statics of Costly information equilibrium with risk-averse drivers
Comparison of Table 5 with Table 4 reveals three diﬀerences in the properties of equilibria with risk-averse
drivers and risk-neutral drivers. First, if the cost of information is positive, suﬃciently risk-averse drivers eschew
buying it and adopt strategy S instead. By contrast, if drivers are risk neutral none choose strategy S if information
is relatively cheap. Second, nS is an increasing function of the number of drivers, N, whereas with risk neutrality
it is independent of N. Third, several of the comparative statics results are ambiguous in sign including all three
of the derivatives for nI. Indeed, it is not possible to rule out that the number of drivers who purchase information
is a (locally) increasing function of the price although it seems highly unlikely that this will be the case.










R Â S ⇔ ϕRS (θ,π;p,N) > 0,
R Â I ⇔ ϕRI (θ,π;p,N) > 0,a n d



























Figure 5: Strategy choice in Costly information equilibrium

























5.3 Welfare eﬀects of Costly information
Four groups of drivers must be distinguished in assessing the welfare eﬀects of Costly information. As shown in
Figure 6, in order of increasing risk aversion these are: drivers who choose strategy R in both the No information
and the Costly information regimes, drivers who choose R with No information and I with Costly information,
drivers who choose S with No information and I with Costly information,a n dﬁnally drivers who choose S in




SI and CV C


















































































































































14The left-hand side of each equation in (3) is expected utility with Costly information, and the right-hand side is
expected utility with No information. Note that the cost of information, π,i sa d d e dt oCV C
RI and CV C
SI for groups
RI and SI which purchase information so that their CVs are deﬁned as net of π. As formalized in Prop. 8 below,
CV C
RR (θ) and CV C
RI (θ) are increasing functions of θ,a n dCV C
SI (θ) and CV C
SS (θ) are decreasing functions of θ.
Consequently, CV is highest for drivers who are indiﬀerent between strategies R and S in the No information
regime in the same way that CV for Free information is highest for the indiﬀerent driver. CV is also negative for
drivers who are suﬃciently risk averse.
Figure 6: Strategy choices for No information and Costly information regimes
Compensating variation for Costly information and Free information c a nb er a n k e db yc o m p a r i n gt h ed e ﬁning
equations in (2) and (3):
CV C
RR (θ) <C VF






RI (θ) ≷ CV F
















SI (θ) ≷ CV F
S (θ) as CV C
RI (θ) ≷ CV F
R (θ),
CV C
SS (θ) ≷ CV F






















Compensating variation for group RR is unambiguously smaller for Costly information than for Free information,
but no general ranking is possible for the other three groups. These results are formalized in Prop. 8 which is the
counterpart to Prop. 2 for Free information:
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) The compensating variation for Costly information, CV C (θ), is an increasing function of risk aversion for
the least risk-averse drivers who take route R with No information, and a decreasing function of risk aversion for
the most risk-averse drivers who take route S with No information.
(b) When the risk aversion parameter is distributed over R+,C VC (θ) < 0 for the most risk-averse drivers.
(c) CV C (θ) <C VF (θ) for the least risk-averse drivers who take route R in both the No information and Costly
information regimes. For other drivers the ranking of CV C (θ) and CV F (θ) is ambiguous.
Proof. Part (a) is proved in Appendix 7, and Part(b) is proved in Appendix 8. Part (c) was proved in the text.
156 Private information
As the cost of information rises towards πC (p,N) the number of drivers who purchase information approaches zero
and information eﬀectively becomes private in the sense that only a few drivers exploit it. As explained in Section
2,t h eCostly information equilibrium approaches the equilibrium with No information and the compensating
variation for Costly information (gross of the cost) approaches the compensating variation for Private information.
The compensating variations for Private information for Groups R and S, CV I
R (θ) and CV I
S (θ) respectively, are
























































































S (θ) > 0. The compensating variation for
Private information is therefore unambiguously positive. Given Assumption 3, CV I
R (θ) is an increasing function of
θ,a n dCV I
S (θ) is a decreasing function of θ so that – once again – compensating variation is highest for drivers
with risk aversion θRS who are indiﬀerent between strategies R and S with No information.
By comparing (4) with (2) and (3), it is clear that the compensating variation for Private information is larger
than the compensating variation for either Free information or Costly information12:
CV I
R (θ) >C VF
R (θ) and CV I
S (θ) >C VF





















R (θ) >C VC
RR (θ) and CV I
R (θ) >C VC



















S (θ) >C VC
SI (θ) and CV I
S (θ) >C VC



















These results are formalized in
Proposition 9 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) The compensating variation for Private information is positive for all drivers: CV I (θ) > 0.
(b) The compensating variation for Private information exceeds the compensating variation for either Free
information or Costly information: CV I (θ) >C VF (θ) and CV I (θ) >C VC (θ).
(c) The compensating variation for Private information is an increasing function of risk aversion for the least
risk-averse drivers who take route R with No information, and a decreasing function of risk aversion for the most
risk-averse drivers who take route S with No information.
Proof. Parts (a) and (b) are proved in the text. Part (c) is proved in Appendix 8.
Private information is more valuable to an individual than is Costly information or Free information because
the beneﬁts from selecting the quicker route diminish as more drivers exploit the information. Diminishing returns
of this sort have been identiﬁed in a number of studies of ATIS with exogenous or endogenous market penetration.
I nt h em o d e lh e r et h en e g a t i v ee x t e r n a le ﬀects of information arise not only because the route choice decisions of
informed drivers raise travel times for other informed drivers, but also because they contribute to uncertainty in
travel times. This impact is especially pernicious for the most risk averse drivers who try to avoid uncertainty by
sticking to the “safe” route. However, uninformed and less risk averse drivers who take the risky route beneﬁt
when informed drivers switch to the safer route on Bad days.
An interesting property of the model is that the compensating variation for Private information for the drivers
with risk aversion θRS who value it most is strictly positive even in the limit as the probability of Bad days decreases
to zero. This result is formalized in:
Proposition 10 If Assumption 3 holds and the risk aversion parameter is distributed over R+, then as the prob-
ability of Bad days decreases to zero the maximum compensating variation for Private information approaches a
limiting value of Min
¡




R (N) − tS (0)
¢
> 0.
12Since Free information is a limiting case of Costly information as the cost of information approaches zero, the ranking of CV I (θ)
and CV F (θ) is necessarily the same as the ranking of CV I (θ) and Lim
π→0
CV C (θ).
16Proof. See Appendix 13.
An intuitive explanation of sorts for Prop. 10 runs as follows. With No information a driver must choose between
Strategy R and Strategy S.I fh ec h o o s e sR,a n dPrivate information then becomes available, he can occasionally
save t
+
R (N)−tS (0) in travel time. Since this is a recovery from the worst state (a Bad day) an extremely risk-averse
driver is willing to pay nearly t
+
R (N)−tS (0) for the information even though it will be exploited only rarely. If the
driver chooses Strategy S instead, and Private information becomes available, he can almost always save tS (0)−t
−
R
in travel time. Since this is a gain in the good state (a Good day) the driver is willing to pay nearly tS (0)−t
−
R for
the information. Now the driver’s expected utility with Private information is a given amount. Hence the driver
will eﬀectively choose between strategies R and S according to which willingness to pay is smaller. Hence the
actual compensating variation for Private information is the lesser of t
+
R (N) − tS (0) and tS (0) − t
−
R.
Prop. 10 contrasts with Propositions 2 and 8 which establish that the compensating variation for Free informa-
tion and Costly information are negative for very risk-averse individuals. This highlights the contrast between the
values of public and private information that was demonstrated by Hirshleifer (1971). It also suggests that there
may be a niche demand for ATIS by highly risk-averse travelers even if travel conditions are fairly predictable.
7 Numerical example
The numerical example is representative of a commuting corridor. Travel time functions for the safe route and the

























where τS and τ
+
R are free-ﬂow travel times, KS and KR are capacities, and b is a parameter. For the base case of the
example the probability of a Bad day is p =0 .2 and the number of drivers is N =1 0 ,000.O t h e rp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s
are τS =2 5min., τ
+
R =2 5min., t
−
R =2 0min., KS =1 0 ,000 per hr., KR =8 ,000 per hr. and b =2 . Drivers have
CARA preferences and θ has a log-logistic distribution with parameter ¯ θ =2 ; i.e. F (θ)=θ/
¡
θ + ¯ θ
¢
= θ/(θ +2 ) .
14 With these parameter values Assumptions 1-4 are all satisﬁed.
7.1 Base-case results
Summary statistics for the equilibria with the base-case parameterization are listed in Column 1 of Table 6.
7.1.1 No information
For the No information regime nZ
R =6 ,654: about two thirds of drivers (those with θ<θ RS =3 .98)c h o o s e
the risky route. Travel time on the risky route is t
−
R =2 0min. on Good days, and t
+Z
R =4 2 .3 min. on Bad days.
Travel time on the safe route is tS =2 7 .8 min. in both states. Expected travel time is pt− +( 1− p)t
Z+
R =2 4 .46
for group R,a n d27.8 min. for group S.G r o u pS therefore incurs more than three min. extra mean travel time
for the privilege of travel time reliability.
7.1.2 Free information
With Free information all drivers take route R on Good days (n
F−
R =1 0 ,000) whereas less than half of them do on
Bad days (n
F+
R =4 ,444). The 4:5 division of traﬃc between the two routes is independent of the distribution of
risk preferences, and the set of drivers who take Route R on Bad days is indeterminate because travel time is known
13De Palma and Picard (2006b) adopt a diﬀerent functional form.
14de Palma and Picard (2005) estimated the distribution of risk aversion for a sample of individuals taking morning trips in the Paris
area. About 60 percent of the sample exhibited risk aversion. For this segment of the sample, absolute risk aversion was found to be
relatively constant and therefore more consistent with CARA than with CRRA preferences. (CARA also has the advantage that it
yields a closed-form expression for compensating variation, whereas CRRA does not.) A least-squares ﬁt for the log-logistic parameter
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Figure 7: Compensating variations for Free, Costly and Private information
in advance. All drivers experience the same travel times of t
−




S =3 2 .72
min. on Bad days. Expected travel time is 22.54 min.: a drop from the No information regime of 1.92 min. for
Group R,a n d5.26 min. for Group S. Average compensating variations are 2.60 min. for Group R,a n d1.38 min.
for Group S. Thus, although Group S experiences a much larger average reduction in travel time as per Theorem
4,i tb e n e ﬁts less from Free information in terms of compensating variation.
Compensating variation for Free information, CV F (θ), is plotted in Figure 7. (The other seven curves are
discussed later.) Consistent with Prop. 2, CV F (θ) reaches a maximum at θRS =3 .98, and then drops –
eventually below zero. Nearly 10 percent of the most risk averse users (with θ>18.7) and over a quarter of Group
S end up worse oﬀ.
7.1.3 Costly information
The numerical counterpart to Figure 5 for the Costly information regime is shown in Figure 8.A s t h e c o s t o f
information rises from 0 to the choke price of πC (p,N)=CV I (θRS)=5 .88, the number of drivers purchasing
information drops steadily to zero. Figure 9 shows how the fractions of drivers in each of the four groups evolve
with π. As expected, the two groups that acquire information (RI and SI) decline steadily in size towards zero,
whereas Groups RR and SS grow.
Figure 10 presents the compensating variation for Costly information by group. The two informed groups
always fare better than do the uninformed, and their beneﬁts increase as information becomes cheaper except
when the price nears zero. As far as the two uninformed groups, the beneﬁts to Group RR increase monotonically
as information becomes cheaper. Group SS gains as well while information is expensive, but it loses out once
information becomes cheaper. Nevertheless, the aggregate beneﬁts for the two uninformed groups increase steadily
because Group SS shrinks in size. Overall, the pattern is one in which most drivers beneﬁt from information while
a small minority of highly risk-averse drivers suﬀer appreciably.
Figure 7 compares the compensating variations for Free information, Costly information and Private information
for several values of π. Consistent with Props. 2, 8 and 9, all three compensating variations reach their maxima
at θ = θRS. And consistent with Prop. 9, CV I (θ) exceeds CV F (θ) and CV C (θ,π) o v e rt h ew h o l er a n g eo f
π. The behaviour of CV C (θ,π) is rather complex. In the lower range of θ, CV C (θ,π) is bounded between 0
and CV F (θ) and decreases monotonically with π. For larger values of θ, CV C (π,θ) >C V F (θ) because highly
risk-averse drivers beneﬁt from the fact that with Costly information fewer drivers shift to the safe route on Bad
days. CV C (π,θ) varies non-monotonically with π: it rises initially, but eventually declines towards zero as the
18Figure 8: Strategy choice in Costly information equilibrium in numerical example
number of informed drivers diminishes and with it the potential for information to be beneﬁcial. However, part
(b) of Prop. 8 guarantees that some drivers are worse oﬀ as long as π<π C (p,N).
7.1.4 Sensitivity analysis
Probability of Bad days Figure 11 shows how the eﬀects of Free information evolve with p (the base-case
value of p =0 .2 is marked by the vertical dashed line). Over most of the range p ∈ [0,0.5] the mean travel time
saving and compensating variation decrease for Group S, and increase for Group R. In the limit as p → 0 the
eﬀects on Group R decrease to zero.
Distribution of risk aversion If parameter ¯ θ of the log-logistic distribution is reduced to zero, the population
degenerates to a set of N identical risk-neutral drivers such as considered in Section 3. Equilibria for this case
are shown in Column 2 of Table 6. Compared to the base case, the fraction of drivers taking route R with No
information increases from roughly 2/3 to 4/5, and the diﬀerence in travel times on R and S on Bad days is
accentuated. Mean travel time savings and compensating variations all coincide at 3.46 min., and all drivers
beneﬁtf r o mFree information by this amount. Figure 12 shows that as parameter ¯ θ rises from 0 through the base
case value of ¯ θ =2and upwards, mean travel time saving and CV F
R fall slowly for Group R. In contrast, for Group
S mean travel time saving rises and CV F
S drops rather sharply so that the divergence between travel time saving
and compensating variation is much sharper than for Group R. Consistent with this, the fraction of drivers made
worse oﬀ by Free information rises from zero at ¯ θ =0to more than one ﬁfth at ¯ θ =8 .
Other variations Raising the number of drivers from N =1 0 ,000 to N =1 5 ,000 (see Column 3 in Table 6)
increases the eﬀects of Free information as expected with the interesting exception that the mean compensating
variation for Group S decreases slightly. This is attributable to the fact that with Free information travel time on
t h es a f er o u t ev a r i e sb y8.25 min. (42.36−34.11) min. compared to only 4.92 min. (32.72−27.80) in the base case.
Reducing the capacity of route R in the bad state from KR =8 ,000 to KR =4 ,000 (see Column 4) results in
similar travel times on Bad days with No information.B u tt h eb e n e ﬁts from Free information are generally larger
because the variation in performance of route R is more pronounced.
In Column 5 parameter b of the travel time function is reduced from b =2to b =1 .15 The main impacts of
15It is usually assumed that travel time is a strictly convex function of ﬂow on a link, and a common choice is to set b =4 .H o w e v e r ,
19Figure 9: Route splits in numerical example
interest are to increase the divergence between mean travel time reduction and compensatng variation for group
S, and to increase the fraction of drivers made worse oﬀ by Free information.16
In Column 6 the free-ﬂow travel time on Route R, τ
+
R, is reduced from 25 min. to 20 min. to match the free-ﬂow
travel time on Good days, τ
−
R.17 This leads to a considerably larger usage of Route R in both the No information
and Free information regimes. The welfare eﬀects of information are slightly smaller than in the base case, but
follow the same pattern.
The ﬁnal “extreme” case (with N =1 5 ,000, b =1 , p =0 .5 and ¯ θ =8 ) combines several of the one-way parameter
variations in a direction designed to accentuate the adverse eﬀects of Free information. Doing so does not aﬀect
greatly the average compensating variation for group R, but it does result in a negative average compensating
variation for Group S (CV F
S = −0.21) and losses for nearly 30 percent of all drivers. This illustrates rather
dramatically that even with heavy congestion, a high probability of capacity loss, and a large proportion of highly
risk-averse drivers, information is not necessarily very beneﬁcial.18
travel time functions are typically speciﬁed in terms of static ﬂows. When speciﬁed in terms of trips, the functional relationship can
be approximately linear. In the case of Vickrey’s bottleneck queuing model with identical travelers and linear schedule delay cost
functions, the relationship is exactly linear (Arnott et al. 1998).
16Raising parameter b to b =4has the mirror image eﬀect of reducing the fraction made worse oﬀ to about 4 percent.




R (0) in Assumption 2, but does not invalidate the equilibrium.
18It is possible to construct examples in which the average compensating variation is negative and a majority of drivers lose. De
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Figure 11: Eﬀects of varying probability of Bad days in numerical example
21Figure 12: Eﬀects of varying parameter ¯ θ in numerical example















R 6,654 8,000 8,963 4,665 7,144 9,117 7,551
nZ
S 3,346 2,000 6,037 5,335 2,856 883 7,449
t
Z+
R 42.30 50.00 56.38 59.01 47.32 37.45 48.60




R 4,444 4,444 6,667 2,857 4,444 5,607 6,667
n
F+





S 32.72 32.72 42.36 37.76 38.89 29.82 45.83
Impacts of Free information
Mean travel time
red’n for group R 1.92 3.46 2.80 4.25 1.69 1.52 1.38
Mean travel time
red’n for group S 5.26 3.46 9.64 8.56 8.36 4.63 10.71
Mean CV F
R
for group R 2.60 3.46 4.21 5.53 2.68 2.08 2.10
Mean CV F
S
for group S 1.38 3.46 1.31 3.92 0.29 1.50 -0.21
Mean CV F
for all drivers 2.19 3.46 3.05 4.67 1.99 1.94 0.96
Max. CV F (θRS) 4.26 3.46 7.24 7.75 5.32 3.73 2.69
% drivers worse oﬀ 9.64 0 15.06 10.62 12.60 6.38 29.85
Private information
Max. CV I (θRS) 5.88 4.80 10.39 9.32 8.54 4.89 4.83
Table 6: Eﬀects of Free information: Sensitivity analysis
† N =1 5 ,000, b =1 , p =0 .5, ¯ θ =8
228 Conclusions and extensions
This paper has studied the information-acquisition and route-choice decisions of risk-averse drivers on a simple road
network with one “safe” route and one “risky” route. Four information regimes are considered: No information,
Free information – which is publicly available at no cost, Costly information – which is publicly available for a
fee, and Private information – which is available free to a single individual.
Several general theoretical results are derived. First, it is drivers with intermediate levels of risk aversion who
purchase information so that they can select the quickest route each day. The least risk-averse drivers remain
uninformed and take the risky route every day, and the most risk-averse drivers take the safe route every day. This
pattern mirrors a ﬁnding of Emmerink et al. (1996) that it is individuals with intermediate demands for travel
who gain the most from information because travel is worthwhile for them under some conditions but not others.
Second, Private information is always beneﬁcial to an individual driver relative to No information,a n dt h e
beneﬁt exceeds the beneﬁts they derive from Free information or Costly information.T h i r d ,Free information and
Costly information beneﬁt drivers who are risk neutral or moderately risk averse. But very risk-averse drivers end
up worse oﬀ even though some of them may be willing to pay for the information. A numerical example suggests
that losers are likely to comprise a relatively small fraction of the population, but also that their losses as measured
by compensating variation can be comparable to the highest gains of other drivers (cf. Figure 10).
The analysis could fruitfully be extended in various directions of which two will be mentioned. One is to examine
more complex road networks. The two-route network with one safe route has the advantage of being amenable to
analytical methods. And it is a natural choice to demonstrate the potential drawbacks of public information to
highly risk-averse drivers. But real applications of ATIS in urban areas have to contend with multiple links and
routes. Furthermore, the property of the model that information is most valuable to drivers with intermediate risk
aversion is counterintuitive insofar as the beneﬁts from information would seem, ap r i o r i , to be greatest for the
most risk-averse individuals. In part, this result is driven by the existence of a safe route with superior “worst-case”
prospects than the other route.
A second extension is to consider alternatives to the expected utility paradigm. Empirical evidence has been
accumulating at least since Allais (1953) that contradicts expected utility theory, and in recent years Prospect
Theory and other non-expected utilities have been applied in transportation research. Nevertheless, there are
several reasons why these alternatives do not (at least yet) oﬀer a clearly superior paradigm to expected utility
theory for analyzing traveler decisions of the sort considered here. First, route-choice decision-making diﬀers
substantially from gambling on monetary values, and it is not obvious that similar behavioral patterns apply in the
two contexts. Moreover, it is not clear what is an appropriate reference point for Prospect Theory (Avineri and
Prashker, 2004). Second, route-choice decisions are made repeatedly for commuting and other routine trips, and it
is plausible that as individuals become familiar with a particular environment their travel decisions will converge
towards expected utility maximization.19 Third, Avineri and Prashker (2005) found that Cumulative Prospect
Theory failed to predict route-choice feedback-based decisions. There is a need for more empirical studies of risk
aversion and route-choice decisions in the context of information provision – both in the ﬁeld and in laboratory
settings (see, for example, Helbing (2004) and Rapoport et al. (2005)).
19Jotisankasa and Polak (2005) review studies of learning in route and departure time choice.
23References
[1] Abdel-Aty, M., R. Kitamura and P.P. Jovanis (1997), ”Using stated preference data for studying the eﬀect of
advanced traﬃc information on drivers’ route choice”, Transportation Research Part C 5C(1), 39-50.
[2] Allais, M. (1953), “Le comportement de l’Homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes
de l’Ecole Américaine”, Econometrica 21(5) 503—546.
[3] Arnott, R., A. de Palma and R. Lindsey (1998), “Recent developments in the bottleneck model”, in K.J.
Button and E.T. Verhoef (eds.), Road Pricing, Traﬃc Congestion and the Environment: Issues of Eﬃciency
and Social Feasibility, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 79-110.
[4] Avineri, E. and J.N. Prashker (2004), “Violations of expected utility theory in route-choice stated-preferences:
The Certainty Eﬀect and inﬂating of small probabilities”, 83rd Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research
Board, Washington, D.C. Conference CD Paper No. 04-2391.
[5] Avineri E. and J. N. Prashker (2005), “Sensitivity to travel time variability”, Transportation Research Part C
13C, 157-183.
[6] Bates, J., J. Polak, P. Jones and A. Cook (2001), “The valuation of reliability for personal travel”, Trans-
portation Research Part E 37E, 191-229.
[7] Brownstone, D. and K.A. Small (2005), “Valuing time and reliability: Assessing the evidence from road pricing
demonstrations,” Transportation Research Part A 39A, 279-293.
[8] de Palma, A. and N. Picard (2005), “Route choice decision under travel time uncertainty”, Transportation
Research Part A 39A, 295-324.
[9] de Palma A., and N. Picard (2006a), “Route choice behavior with risk averse users”. In P. Nijkamp and A.
Reggiani (eds.), Spatial Evolution and Modelling, Ch. 7, Edward Elgar, 139-178.
[10] de Palma, A. and N. Picard (2006b), “Equilibria and information provision in risky networks with risk averse
drivers”, Transportation Science 40(4), 393-408.
[11] Emmerink, R.H.M., E.T. Verhoef, P. Nijkamp and P. Rietveld (1996), “Endogenizing demand for information
in road transport”, Annals of Regional Science 30(2), 201-222.
[12] Helbing, D. (2004), “Dynamic decision behavior and optimal guidance through information services: Models
and experiments”. In: M. Schreckernberg and R. Selten (eds.), Human Behavior and TraﬃcN e t w o r k s , Berlin:
Springer, 48-95.
[13] Hirshleifer, J. (1971), “The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity”,
American Economic Review 61(4), 561-574.
[14] Jotisankasa, A., and J.W. Polak (2005), “Modelling learning and adaptation in route and departure time choice
behaviour: Achievements and prospects”, in M. Lee-Gosselin and S. Doherty (eds.), Integrated Land-Use and
Transport Models, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 133-157.
[15] Kobayashi, K. (1994), “Information, rational expectations and network equilibria - an analytical perspective
for route guidance systems”, The Annals of Regional Science 28(4), 369-393.
[16] Lam, T.C. and K.A. Small (2001), “The value of time and reliability: Measurement from a value pricing
experiment”, Transportation Research Part E 37E, 231-251.
[17] Lo, H.K. and W.Y. Szeto (2002), “A methodology for sustainable traveler information services”, Transportation
Research Part B 36B(2), 113-130.
[18] Rapoport, A., T. Kugler, S. Dugar and E.J. Tisches (2005), “Braess Paradox in the lab-
oratory: An experimental study of route choice in traﬃc networks with asymmetric costs”
(http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=783424, accessed July 30, 2005).
24[19] Small, K.A., C. Winston and J. Yan (2005), “Uncovering the distribution of motorists’ preferences for travel
time and reliability”, Econometrica 73, 1367-1382.
[20] Varian, H.R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis, third edition, Norton.
[21] Yang (1998), “Multiple equilibrium behaviors and ATIS with endogenous market penetration”, Transportation
Research Part B 32B(3), 205-218.
[22] Yin, Y. and H. Ieda (2001), “Assessing performance reliability of road networks under nonrecurrent conges-
tion”, Transportation Research Record 1771, 148-155.
[23] Yin, Y., W.H.K. Lam and H. Ieda (2004), “New technology and the modeling of risk-taking behavior in
congested road networks”, Transportation Research Part C 12C(3-4), 171-192.
[24] Zhang, R. and E.T. Verhoef (2006), “A monopolistic market for advanced traveler information systems and
road use eﬃciency”, Transportation Research Part A 40A(5), 424-443.
259A p p e n d i x e s
9.1 Appendix 1: Assumption 3, CRRA and CARA preferences
9.1.1 CRRA preferences
U (t;θ)=−t1+θ
1+θ is diﬀerentiable and U (t;0) = −t.F o r θ>0 and t>0, U (t;θ) is negative and strictly









.N o w t1+θ = −(1 + θ)U,a n dlnt =
ln(−(1+θ)U)
1+θ .







1+θ ,a n d
∂2φ
∂U2 = 1













θ is diﬀerentiable and U (t;0) = −t.F o r θ>0 and t>0, U (t;θ) is negative and strictly
concave in t. ∂U
∂θ =
−θ+texp(θt)+exp(θt)−1
θ2 .Now exp(θt)=1 − θU,a n dt =
ln(1−θU)













θ ,a n d
∂2φ











exp(θ(t2 − t1)) = ∞ for t2 >t 1 > 0.
9.2 Appendix 2: Comparative statics properties of equilibria with risk-neutral drivers
9.2.1 No information regime
In the No information equilibrium the division of traﬃc, nZ
R and nZ
S, equalizes expected travel costs between routes:














,w h e r enZ
S = N − nZ
R. Comparative statics properties of the equilibrium




















































9.2.2 Costly information regime
Equilibrium when nC
S > 0 If strategies R, I and S are all adopted in the Costly information equilibrium, the
numbers in each group, nC
R, nC
S and nC




I = N,( 6 )
and two equal-cost conditions. First, the expected costs of Strategies I and R must be equal:

































: the cost of information must balance the travel time
saving gained by taking Route S rather than Route R on Bad days. Second, the expected costs of Strategies I and
S must be equal:



























: the cost of information must balance the travel time
saving gained by taking Route R rather than Route S on Good days.





































































































































∂p switches sign from positive to negative as p increases.
Equilibrium when nC
S =0 If the cost of information is suﬃciently small, the condition I ≈ S is not satisﬁed
even with nC
S =0 ; i.e. π<(1 − p)
¡




. If so, Condition (8) is not applicable and the equilibrium is
derived using Conditions (6) and (7) with nC
S =0 . The comparative statics properties of the model are the same
as for nC























$ > 0, so that the ambiguity in the sign of this
derivative is eliminated.
9.3 Appendix 3: Proof of Theorem 1
Part (a) follows from the inequality tS (0) >t
−
R.F o rP a r t( b )d e ﬁne Ψ(nR) ≡ t
+
R (nR)−tS (N − nR).B yA s s u m p t i o n
1, Ψ(nR) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of nR. By Assumption 2, Ψ(0) = t
+
R (0) − tS (N) < 0,
and Ψ(N)=t
+
R (N) − tS (0) > 0. Hence there exists a unique n
F+






















9.4 Appendix 4: Proof of Theorem 2












− U (tS (N − NR);θ).








+ tS (N − NR) > 0.G i v e n t
+
R (NR) >t S (N − NR) and Assumption 3,
Lim
θ→∞






=0and hence R ≈ S.L e tL e tEi denote the expectations operator for route i, i ∈ {R,S}.






∂θ . By Assumption 3, ∂U/∂θ is a strictly concave
function of U. Hence by Jensen’s inequality
∂ψ(p,NR;θ)
∂θ
¯ ¯ ¯θ=˜ θ
Z(p,NR) < 0 . (9)
This proves that ˜ θ
Z
(p,NR) is unique. Furthermore,
ψ (p,NR;θ) ≷ 0asθ ≶ ˜ θ
Z
(p,NR). (10)
Part (b): Consider p0 >p .S i n c et
+






> 0. Given (9) it follows that
˜ θ
Z
(p0,N R) < ˜ θ
Z
(p,NR); hence ˜ θ
Z
(p,NR) is strictly decreasing in p.
Now consider ´ NR >N R.S i n c et
+
R (NR) is increasing in NR and tS (N − NR) is decreasing in NR, ψ
³





0. By similar reasoning it follows that ˜ θ
Z
(p,NR) is strictly decreasing in NR.
279.5 Appendix 5: Proof of Theorem 3
On the one hand, since the cdf F (θ) is continuous and strictly increasing for θ ∈ I, n(θ)=NF (θ) deﬁnes an
increasing relationship, with n(0) = 0 and n(θ) →
θ→∞
N. On the other hand, Theorem 2 implies that ˜ θ
Z
(p,NR)
deﬁnes a decreasing relationship between θ and n,w i t hn(θ) ∈ [0,N]. The two curves therefore cross exactly once,
which deﬁnes nZ
R (p) and ˜ θ
Z













− U (tS (N − n);θ).
















< 0 and ∂Ω
∂p < 0. Decreasing utility and






is decreasing in n and U (tS (N − n);θ) is increasing in n,s o∂Ω
∂n < 0.













=0 , Ω(p,n;θ) > 0 for any θ<˜ θ
Z
(p,n) and Ω(p,n;θ) < 0 for any θ>˜ θ
Z



























9.6 Appendix 6: Proof of Theorem 4

































































































.T h eﬁrst inequality
follows from Part (a). The second inequality follows from equation (11) and ˜ θ
Z
> 0.
Part (c): Travel times in the No information and Free information regimes are given in the following table:
Row Regime Group Good days Bad days
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9.7 Appendix 7: Compensating variation and degree of risk aversion
Let travel time in the No information regime (Z)b eT1 on Good days, and T2 on Bad days. And let travel time
in the Free information (F), Costly information (C), or Private information regime (I)b eT3 on Good days, and
T4 on Bad days. The compensating variation CV r (θ) for information regime r, r ∈ {F,C,I},i sd e ﬁned by the
condition
Ψ(θ) ≡ EUr (CV r (θ);θ) − EUZ (θ)=0 ,
or
(1 − p)U (T3 + CV r (θ);θ)+pU (T4 + CV r (θ);θ) − (1 − p)U (T1;θ) − pU (T2;θ)=0 .
Two generic cases cover all the cases considered in the text.
289.7.1 Case 1: T1 = T3 <T 4 <T 2
This case covers CV F
R , CV C
RR, CV C
RI and CV I
R. Compensating variation for these cases is guaranteed to be positive.







∂θ . By Assumption 3, ∂U/∂θ is a strictly concave function of U.




CV r(θ) > 0.G i v e n
∂ψ
∂CV r(θ) < 0, it follows that CV r (θ) is an increasing function
of θ for Case 1.
9.7.2 Case 2: T3 <T 1 = T2 ≤ T4
This case covers CV F
S , CV C
SI, CV C
SS and CV I
S. Compensating variation is not guaranteed to be positive. But
whether or not it is positive, after compensating variation is added to travel times U3 >U 1 = U2 >U 4. Information




CV r(θ) < 0,a n dCV r (θ) is a decreasing function of θ for Case 2.
9.8 Appendix 8: Compensating variation is negative for suﬃciently risk-averse
drivers
For brevity let tZ denote (certain) travel time with No information, tG travel time on Good days with information,
and tB >t G travel time on Bad days with information. CV (θ) is deﬁned by the condition





















=0at t = CV (θ).
If t<t Z − tB then Lim
θ→∞
H (t;θ)=0 ,a n dLim
θ→∞
G(t;θ)=∞.I f t>t Z − tB then Lim
θ→∞





















































9.9 Appendix 9: Proof of Proposition 3
Part (a): The proof follows closely the proof of Theorem 2. R R S ⇐⇒ ψRS (θ;p,nR,n S,n I) T 0.I f R Â S
for all θ ∈ [0,∞) then ˆ θRS =0 .I f R ≺ S for all θ ∈ [0,∞) then ˆ θRS = ∞. If neither preference ranking




=0 .N o w






∂θ .B yA s s u m p t i o n3 ,∂U/∂θ is a strictly concave
function of U, and hence by Jensen’s inequality
∂ψRS
∂θ
¯ ¯ ¯θ=ˆ θRS < 0 , (14)
and ˆ θRS is unique. Furthermore,
ψRS (θ;p,nR,n S,n I) ≷ 0 as θ ≶ ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I). (15)
Part (b): Consider p0 >p .S i n c et
−
R <t S (nS) and t
+

























ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I);p0,n R,n S,n I
´
< 0. Given (14) it follows that
ˆ θRS (p0,n R,n S,n I) < ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I).
This proves that ˆ θRS is decreasing in p. The comparative statics properties for nR, nS and nI are derived similarly
using the respective inequalities
ψRS
³
ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I);p,n0
R,n S,n I
´




ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I);p,nR,n 0
S,n I
´




ˆ θRS (p,nR,n S,n I);p,nR,n S,n 0
I
´
> 0 for n0
I >n I.
9.10 Appendix 10: Proof of Proposition 4
Part (a): The proof follows the proof of Prop. 3(a) by replacing regime S by regime I.




R + π and t
+



























ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI),π;p0,n R,n S + nI
´
< 0. The counterpart to Condition (15) is
ψRI (θ,π;p,nR,n S + nI) ≷ 0 as θ ≶ ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI). (16)
It follows that
ˆ θRI (π,p0,n R,n S + nI) < ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI).
The comparative statics properties for nR, π and nS + nI are derived similarly using the respective inequalities
ψRI
³
ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI),π;p,n0
R,n S + nI
´




ˆ θRI (π,p,nR,n S + nI),π0;p,nR,n S + nI
´
> 0 for π0 >π ,
ψRI
³




> 0 for n0
S + n0
I >n S + nI.
9.11 Appendix 11: Proof of Proposition 5
Part (a): The proof follows the proof of Prop. 3(a) by replacing regime R by regime I.
Part (b): The comparative statics properties for π, p, nI, nS,a n dnS with nS + nI held constant are derived
using the respective inequalities
ψIS
³
ˆ θIS (π,p,nS,n I),π0;p,nS,n I
´
< 0 for π0 >π ,
ψIS
³
ˆ θIS(π,p,nS,n I),π;p0,n S,n I
´
< 0 for p0 >p ,
ψIS
³
ˆ θIS(π,p,nS,n I),π;p,nS,n 0
I
´
















S >n S and n0
S + n0
I = nS + nI








∂U (tS (nS + nI)+π;θ)
∂t
−
∂U (tS (nS + nI);θ)





∂tS (nS + nI)
∂NS | {z }
+
< 0,







∂U (tS (nS + nI)+π;θ)
∂t
−
∂U (tS (nS + nI);θ)





∂tS (nS + nI)




∂t | {z }
−
∂tS (nS)
∂NS | {z }
+
≷ 0.






= −(1 − p)
∂U (tS (nS);θ)
∂t | {z }
−
∂tS (nS)
∂NS | {z }
+
> 0.
9.12 Appendix 12: Comparative statics of Costly information equilibrium
The ﬁve endogenous variables {nR,n S,n I,θ A,θB} are determined by the ﬁve equations
nR = NF(θA), (17)
nI = N (F (θB) − F (θA)), (18)
nS = N (1 − F (θA)), (19)




















and indiﬀerence between Strategies I and S at θ = θB:






= pU(tS(N − nR);θB)+( 1−p)U(tS(nS);θB). (21)
Variable nI does not appear in eqns. (20) or (21), and hence can be solved ex post using eqn. (18). To simplify













<t S(nS + nI)
| {z }
t4









and deﬁne mij ≡
∂U(ti;θj)
∂t < 0, ci ≡ ∂ti
∂ni > 0, vij ≡
∂U(ti;θj)
∂θ < 0 and Uij ≡ U (ti;θj) < 0,i=1 ,...,6,j= A,B.20
Eqns. (17), (19), (20) and (21) can then be written:
nR − NF (θA)=0 , (22)
nS − N (1 − F (θB)) = 0, (23)
p(U6A− U5A)+( 1− p)(U1A− U2A)=0 , (24)
p(U4B− U5B)+( 1− p)(U3B− U2B)=0 . (25)
Equations (22) and (24) are separable in nR and θA.T h et o t a ld i ﬀerentials are
∙
1 −Nf(θA)






20Note that c1 = c2 =0<c 3 ≤ c4 = c5.
31∙
00 F (θA)




























⎣U5 − U6 + U1 − U2 | {z }
+
⎤


































A p[m5Ac5 (1 − F (θA)) − m6Ac6F (θA)]
s =?, (30)
where
s =? indicates that the sign is indeterminate. Equations (23) and (25) can be used to derive the compara-












00 1 − F (θB)
pm5B +( 1− p)m2B
+p(m4Bc4 − m5Bc5) dnR
dπ
U5 − U4 + U3 − U2
+p(m4Bc4 − m5Bc5) dnR
dp






















⎣pm5B +( 1− p)m2B | {z }
−

















⎣U5 − U4 + U3 − U2 | {z }
−
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
> 0. (33)
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9.13 Appendix 13: Proof of Proposition 10
The proof has a similar structure to the proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 9, CV I (θ) is maximal at θ = θRS,



















































































= tS (0), Lim
p→0























































































































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
=0at t = CV I (θRS).
There are two cases to consider.




R (N) − tS (0).




J (·)=0 .A n dg i v e ntS (0) + t<t S (0) + t
+
















CV I (θRS)=tS (0) − t
−
R.
9.13.2 Case 2: t
+





R (N) − tS (0) then Lim
p→0
J (·)=0 , Lim
p→0





R (N) − tS (0) then Lim
p→0






R (N) − tS (0).








R (N) − tS (0)
¢
.
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